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ABSTRACT 
The use of decentralized virtual currencies (DVCs) by terrorist organizations 
(TOs) on a significant scale could present unique challenges for regulators, policy 
makers, and law enforcement because they offer the potential for an illicit funding 
network that can be very difficult to disrupt or even detect. However, the body of existing 
research regarding the threat of terrorists' use of DVCs has determined that though it has 
become the payment method of choice for cybercriminals and many transnational 
criminal organizations, researchers do not believe that TOs will leverage DVCs on an 
appreciable scale in the near future. To justify their determinations, prior researchers cite 
insufficient market size, anonymity, and broad commercial acceptance, coupled with a 
perceived lack of TOs’ technological sophistication, as limits to the practical use of 
DVCs over other better-established and less complicated terror funding methods. They 
further suggest that existing AML/CFT regulations, narrowly applied to DVC exchanges 
should be sufficient to catch terror financiers. However, this thesis identifies recent 
developments in DVCs and the ecosystems that support them that suggest all of the 
primary pillars on which prior research has been built may have eroded sufficiently to 
warrant further investigation into the potential threat posed by terrorist use of DVCs. The 
homeland security enterprise must not be lulled into complacency by what this thesis 
finds to be already outdated research.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Security analysts have assessed the threat posed by the potential use of de-
centralized virtual currencies (DVCs), like Bitcoin (the oldest and most well-known DVC), 
by terrorist organizations (TOs) to be very low.1 These recent assessments have been based 
in large part on four key assumptions about DVCs: limited market size, narrow range of 
mainstream acceptance, a lack of sufficient anonymity, and the presumed limits of 
terrorists’ technological sophistication. But, in late 2017, DVCs experienced an 
exponential rise in market value, rapid growth in mainstream commercial acceptance, and 
tremendous investment devoted to new anonymizing technologies. Considering these 
recent developments, there is value in asking two questions: Will recent market growth, 
more mainstream acceptance, and advancements in anonymizing technologies make DVCs 
more attractive for use in financing terrorism; and how should regulators and law 
enforcement agencies respond to these developments, assuming that DVCs will, in fact, be 
adopted by criminal organizations and terrorists who seek to avoid financial surveillance 
by regulatory and law enforcement authorities? 
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
A primary focus of U.S. counterterrorism strategy is detecting and disrupting the 
financing of terrorism.2 Terror financing relies on numerous means to move money around 
the globe, including the traditional banking sector, informal cash courier systems like 
hawala networks, money services businesses (MSB) such as PayPal or Western Union, as 
well as new payment products and services (NPPS), including DVCs, that are part of a 
technologically-enabled “shadow banking” sector that poses a direct challenge to 
1 Zachary K. Goldman et al., “Terrorist Use of Virtual Currencies: Containing the Potential Threat” 
(Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, May 2017), 
https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/terrorist-use-of-virtual-currencies; David Carlisle, 
“Cryptocurrencies and Terrorist Financing: A Risk, But Hold the Panic,” Royal United Services Institute, 
www.rusi.org, March 2017, https://rusi.org/commentary/cryptocurrencies-and-terrorist-financing-risk-hold-
panic. 
2 Bennett Seftel, “Hawala Networks: The Paperless Trail of Terrorist Transactions,” Cipher Brief 
website, www.thecipherbrief.com, March 16, 2016, https://www.thecipherbrief.com/article/middle-
east/hawala-networks-the-paperless-trail-of-terrorist-transactions. 
2 
conventional financial institutions’ business practices.3 Though government institutions 
have developed a number of tools to combat terror financing, all of which are based on 
enhancing transparency within financial systems, any means of rapidly and anonymously 
moving large sums of money while simultaneously masking the identity and ownership 
interest of the parties involved is bound to catch the interest of TOs.4 Indeed, DVCs and 
their supporting technologies promise low-cost, high-speed, secure, and anonymous 
financial transactions to anyone who can use a computer or smartphone. Coupled with the 
global, cross-border reach of DVCs’ decentralized design, this same promise may make 
DVCs an attractive choice to TOs—increasingly even to those with little or no 
demonstrated technological savvy. 
The use of DVCs by TOs on a scale that competes with cash, hawala transfers, or 
other readily available means of financing could present unique challenges for regulators, 
policy makers, and law enforcement because it offers the potential for an illicit funding 
network that can be very difficult to disrupt or even detect. However, the body of existing 
research regarding the threat of terrorists’ use of DVCs all basically agrees that though 
virtual currencies are emerging as a payment method of choice for cybercriminals and such 
transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) as drug cartels, international smuggling rings, 
and organized crime syndicates, there is no evidence that TOs are leveraging DVCs on an 
appreciable scale, nor will they anytime in the near future. 
This prior research suggests that insufficient market size, anonymity, and broad 
commercial acceptance, coupled with a perceived lack of TOs’ technological 
sophistication, limits the practical use of DVC technology over other more well-established 
and less complicated terror funding methods. Furthermore, it suggests that existing anti-
money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regulations, 
narrowly applied to DVC exchanges (where users of DVCs “cash out” and convert their 
virtual currency into hard currency), should be sufficient to catch terror financiers. 
                                                 
3 Ellie Maruyama and Kelsey Hallahan, “Following the Money: A Primer on Terrorist Financing” 
(Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, June 2017), 
https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/following-the-money-1. 
4 Maruyama and Hallahan. 
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However, considering recent developments in DVCs and the markets that support them, 
the pillars on which prior research has been built may have eroded sufficiently to warrant 
the United States and its allies taking another look at the potential threat. 
This thesis builds on existing research on terror finance by highlighting recent 
technological developments in DVCs, how these developments might enhance the 
capabilities of terrorist organizations, and how states are responding to the advent of DVCs 
through regulation and enforcement policies (some of which may be in the earliest stages 
of development). The thesis also explores how recent broad acceptance, skyrocketing 
value, and rapidly evolving technology in support of existing and developing DVCs 
increases the likelihood that this technology will be used for money laundering, financing 
terrorism, and evading sanctions. Though only anecdotal evidence exists of recent 
attempted terrorist use of DVCs, the ongoing efforts by governments and financial 
institutions to address the possibility serves as significant evidence of their 
acknowledgement of the threat. Additionally, the possibility should not be ignored that 
TOs may now be more effectively leveraging dark web markets (DWMs) and utilizing 
anonymizing and obfuscating technology to more successfully evade detection. While this 
assertion may be difficult to prove, there is value in exploring the regulatory and 
enforcement steps that are being taken by governments and institutions—expressed in the 
form of policies, white papers, and international agreements—and understanding these 
measures as an effort to harness an otherwise unregulated field of financial activity, while 
simultaneously creating frameworks and mechanisms that disrupt the ability of criminal 
and terrorist actors to exploit rapidly-evolving financial technology (fintech), of which 
DVCs are an example.5 
5 The IMF provides a loose definition of what is often called “fintech,” when Dong He et al. describes 
“A new wave of technological innovations…accelerating change in the financial sector. Fintech leverages 
the explosion of big data on individuals and firms, advances in artificial intelligence, computing power, 
cryptography, and the reach of the Internet. The strong complementarities among these technologies are 
giving rise to an impressive array of new applications touching on services from payments to financing, 
asset management, insurance, and advice. The possibility now looms that entities driven by fintech may 
emerge as competitive alternatives to traditional financial intermediaries, markets, and infrastructures.” 
Dong He et al., “Fintech and Financial Services: Initial Considerations,” Staff Discussion Notes 
(Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, June 2017), 7, 
http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/SPROLLs/Staff-Discussion-Notes. 
4 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review highlights some of the recent assessments of the risk DVCs 
pose as an instrument of terror financing and describes the assumptions that underpin those 
judgments. 
1. High Threat Assessments 
A number of authors have identified DVCs as a near-term, if not immediate, 
challenge for the homeland security enterprise charged with tracking questionable financial 
transactions. Jared Kleiman authored one of the earliest peer-reviewed papers about the 
threat of DVCs to national security in which he raises “Concerns about the government’s 
ability to detect terrorist group financing.”6 He specifies the ability to conduct anonymous 
financial transactions as a serious hindrance to detecting illicit financing, and cites a 2012 
case where Iranians traded DVC for normally unobtainable U.S. dollars and then held them 
in accounts outside of the country to avoid sanctions.7 Ultimately, Kleiman assessed that 
governments should be “taking the threat of untraceable online transactions seriously, 
finding that DVCs may be used as a discrete method for financing terror groups.”8 
In the same year as Kleiman’s assessment, the core findings of a Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS)—Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute (HSSAI) 
report on the Risks and Threats of Cryptocurrencies noted that DVCs “may in time 
represent a revolution in money laundering,”9 but the report concludes that, due to the 
relatively small size of the DVC market, cash will likely continue to pose the greatest 
AML/CFT challenge for the foreseeable future. The report acknowledges, however, that 
TOs are quickly adapting to technology and increasing the sophistication of their financing 
methods, and further acknowledges that the use of DVCs by TOs would certainly increase 
if the popularity and mainstream acceptance of DVCs increased. 
                                                 
6 Jared A. Kleiman, “Beyond the Silk Road: Unregulated Decentralized Virtual Currencies Continue to 
Endanger U.S. National Security and Welfare,” National Security Law Brief 4, no. 1 (2013): 74. 
7 Kleiman, 74–75. 
8 Kleiman, 75. 
9 HSSAI, “Risks and Threats of Cryptocurrencies” (Falls Church, VA: Homeland Security Studies and 
Analysis Institute, December 31, 2014), 23. 
5 
In a 2016 issue of the Journal of Money Laundering Control, Irwin and Milad note 
that parties supporting the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and other TOs had “posted 
YouTube videos, discussion forum links and links to research on the anonymity provided 
by Bitcoins”10 to raise money for terror related activities. As an example, the authors refer 
to an article posted on-line in 2014 by an ISIS supporter that specifically instructs jihadist 
sympathizers how to utilize Bitcoin and third-party anonymizing software to fund jihadists, 
as well as how to access hidden DWMs to buy goods and services to benefit TOs. 
Additionally, the authors cite unverified reports by a reputable financial security firm, who 
in 2015 claims to have tracked millions of dollars of transfers and transactions in DVCs to 
numerous wallets they believed to be owned by ISIS.11 
Irwin and Milad go further than reporting on just transactions and instructional 
material found online. They state that “there is evidence to suggest that Bitcoins have been 
utilized in a number of successful terror attacks,”12 including the coordinated November 
2015 attacks in France, to illustrate that DVCs are not just a future AML/CFT threat, but 
that cryptocurrencies are already in use by TOs. While they ultimately conclude that the 
scale of use is likely small compared to other funding methods, they assert the more 
important point is that these cases verify that TOs are actively “trying to understand new 
and evolving technologies” and that “it is likely that use of these mediums will only 
increase in the future.”13 
2. Low Threat Assessments
Following these early assessments, a recurring theme has emerged more recently 
from academic and professional discussions in 2016 and 2017 that DVCs should be 
acknowledged as a potential money laundering, terrorist financing, and sanctions-evasion 
threat, but that there is little reason to believe that DVCs will be used on a large scale; it is 
10 A.S.M. Irwin and G. Milad, “The Use of Crypto-Currencies in Funding Violent Jihad,” Journal of 
Money Laundering Control 19, no. 4 (2016): 410. 
11 Irwin and Milad, 410. 
12 Irwin and Milad, 410. 
13 Irwin and Milad, 411. 
6 
more likely that regulators and law enforcement officials will note anecdotal, small-scale 
uses in the near future. One such assessment by Dong He et al. at the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), notes that existing AML/CFT measures applied to DVC exchanges 
should be effective deterrents, considering TOs need to convert DVCs into fiat currency 
before they can use it.14 However, this report goes on to say that “If the use of VCs becomes 
so widespread that there is no longer a need for participants to ‘cash out’ (that is, convert 
the DVCs into fiat currency), it may be necessary to extend regulation to other VC network 
participants…that operate entirely within the system.”15 Dong He and the IMF re-deliver 
nearly the same assessment, including a near identical caveat regarding the risk of more 
widespread use, in a June 2017 report on fintech and financial services.16 These reports 
allude to the idea that an increased AML/CFT threat could arise if DVCs were to gain 
sufficient popularity to spawn a parallel economy that exists outside the purview of current 
regulatory authority. 
David Carlisle of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in the UK, published 
an assessment of DVCs and financial crime in March of 2017, where he states, “terrorist 
financing with VCs is best regarded as an emerging and potential risk, rather than a 
crystalised one.”17 He alludes to TOs’ lack of technological abilities or possibly a lack of 
infrastructure when he says that TOs “may find VCs technically and practically difficult to 
use,”18 and goes further to assert that they already have a number of other more established 
channels of finance and so likely have little need for DVCs. 
Just a few paragraphs later, however, Carlisle cites a 2015 example of a U.S. 
teenager who was given jail time for “using Twitter to describe how to use Bitcoin to 
                                                 
14 Dong He et al., “Virtual Currencies and Beyond: Initial Considerations,” Staff Discussion Notes 
(Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, January 2016), 27, 
http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/SPROLLs/Staff-Discussion-Notes?page=1. 
15 He et al., 27. 
16 He et al., “Fintech and Financial Services: Initial Considerations,” 16. 
17 David Carlisle, “Virtual Currencies and Financial Crime: Challenges and Opportunities” (London: 
Royal United Services Institute, March 2017), 17, https://rusi.org/publication/occasional-papers/virtual-
currencies-and-financial-crime-challenges-and-opportunities. 
18 Carlisle, 17. 
7 
support Daesh.”19 He further reports that a Daesh operative in Indonesia, alleged to have 
plotted a 2016 attack in Jakarta, used DVC to transact with other jihadis.20 While Carlisle 
ultimately dismisses TOs’ use of DVCs as anecdotal, he concedes that some experts believe 
that TOs “are becoming rapidly more technologically adept; as this trend continues, VCs 
could become an increasingly viable financing tool for terrorists.”21 Carlisle provided 
additional commentary about the subject on the RUSI website, where he reiterated that 
while many of the characteristics of DVCs may seem very appealing to ISIS and other TOs, 
“the threat landscape presents a more muted picture.”22 The title of the web article itself 
conveys RUSI and Carlisle’s overall message on the subject: Cryptocurrencies and 
Terrorist Financing: A Risk, But Hold the Panic. 
Zachary Goldman et al., of the Center for a New American Security, provide one 
of the most recent studies, from May 2017, that builds on the same primary arguments 
presented in the years prior: DVCs are not yet as anonymous as cash and other more 
established methods of illicit finance; TOs lack technical sophistication or a broad peer-to-
peer network of trust; and “Terrorists mostly need fiat currency to fulfill their funding 
requirements, so there is no reason to introduce the complications involved in using virtual 
currencies.”23 Additionally, Goldman et al. indicate that DVCs lack the market size and 
liquidity needed to be useful to TOs at scale. They specifically note that as of March 20, 
2017, the market cap of the oldest and most widely known DVC, Bitcoin, was roughly $17 
billion, while the market cap of newer, more anonymous DVCs such as Monero and ZCash 
were $340 million and $22 million, respectively.24 Goldman et al. contrast these figures to 
the U.S. government’s estimate that “illicit financing generates $300 billion per year,”25 
19 Carlisle, 18. 
20 Carlisle, 18. 
21 Carlisle, 18. 
22 Carlisle, “Cryptocurrencies and Terrorist Financing: A Risk, But Hold the Panic.” 
23 Goldman et al., “Terrorist Use of Virtual Currencies: Containing the Potential Threat,” 26. 
24 Goldman et al., “Terrorist Use of Virtual Currencies: Containing the Potential Threat.” 
25 Goldman et al., 18. 
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alluding to the idea that DVCs lack sufficient scale and liquidity for terrorists use even in 
the unlikely event they may attempt to do so. 
This brief review of the existing literature on the broad subject of DVCs and terror 
financing demonstrates that observers of this security challenge fall into one of two 
categories: those who see a near-term threat posed by a technology that is becoming more 
widely-accepted by the public, and those who see the possibility of risk in the future but 
note that there is no clear evidence that TOs will adopt the technology to support their 
operations when other less sophisticated (or more established) means of money transfer 
exist. This thesis explores both positions and identifies steps that regulatory and law 
enforcement authorities are taking to address the challenge presented by recent 
developments surrounding DVCs, since regardless of whether the threat is near-term or 
long-term, an argument can be made that if efforts to police DVCs are actively being 
developed by policy makers, then the risk is real. 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN AND SOURCES 
The research for this thesis involved a comprehensive analysis of the foundations 
upon which recent scholarly works built their modest assessments of the threat posed by 
DVCs to terror finance. These foundational arguments were evaluated using more recent 
information derived from numerous sources, including government data, academic 
publications, and open-source reports on the utility and deployment of DVCs. Subject-
matter expert opinions and pre-existing interviews from officials at the U.S. Department of 
the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), and developers of DVC related fintech were utilized 
whenever possible. 
Data derived from government reports and estimates were used to establish a 
baseline for the amount of money TOs would need to operate annually, while open source 
data on the overall DVC market size and liquidity are used to determine if sufficient supply 
could be achieved to meet TO demand. These reports expound upon the U.S. financial 
system’s regulatory framework, illustrating how the United States is attempting to respond 
to the challenges posed by DVCs, and illustrate why TOs might seek out weaker regulatory 
9 
environments to use DVCs with little fear of surveillance or confiscation by counter-
terrorism authorities. 
Academic publications on the subject of DVCs, and other open-source materials 
(trade and technical publications) established the growth trend of DVCs’ mainstream 
acceptance around the world. However, any discussion of the growth of DVCs’ adoption 
within DWM on the unindexed Internet and illicit communities relies almost entirely on 
news articles, and forum and blog posts due to a lack of access to the dark web. 
Government reports, scholarly articles, white papers, and open source news reports 
provided information about the mechanisms that have been developed recently to address 
known vulnerabilities in older, more widely used pseudonymous DVCs. Government 
reports and some scholarly articles were also utilized for information on third party 
anonymizing web tools designed to further complicate and obfuscate DVC transactions. 
This thesis relies on published primary sources including transcripts from 
congressional hearings, government agency reports, and industry publications; and 
published secondary sources such as peer-reviewed sources, open source material from 
news agencies and DVC industry stakeholders, and online DVC user sources (blog posts 
and discussion forums). Relevant AML/CFT laws and regulations, including the Bank 
Secrecy Act (BSA) and Title III of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USAPATRIOT) Act, are 
explored to the level of detail necessary to understand how DVC use and development is 
currently addressed by existing policy, and transcripts of supporting interviews with 
subject matter experts at federal law enforcement agencies are cited where appropriate. 
The technology explored in this thesis is evolving rapidly, as is the response of 
governments to the uses and abuses of fintech. Every effort has been made to find and use 
the most credible and relevant information available; using primary and secondary sources 
in accordance with appropriate research protocols. The author did not have access to the 
so-called “dark web,” or conduct anthropological research by attempting to contact actors 
who are working to hide their activities from the general public and law-enforcement 
officials. 
10 
Every attempt has been made to present broad-based and comprehensive 
information from the literature referenced for this thesis, however, new DVCs are being 
developed and marketed almost daily, making it difficult or impossible to assess DVCs as 
a group with accuracy or precision. The information used, and sources cited are as current 
as possible and deemed valid at the time of writing. 
D. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The first chapter of this thesis presents the primary research question and its 
importance to the homeland security enterprise, as well as the literature review and chapter 
outline. The second chapter provides background information regarding DVCs consisting 
of three primers on subjects necessary to understand the core matter of this thesis: 
contemporary terrorism finance, a fundamental explanation of what DVCs are, including 
the basics of how a virtual currency typically functions, and finally, a review of the current 
regulations and policies that have evolved to encompass DVCs. These sections are not 
meant to be an in-depth technical analysis, but rather practical explanations sufficient for 
the reader to understand how the nexus of the three are relevant. Additionally, this chapter 
expounds on the known traditionally utilized methods of terror finance and summarizes the 
reasons why prior research has determined that TOs are likely to continue these methods 
rather than engage in the use of DVCs on any meaningful scale. This context is important 
because “traditional” terror finance has been extensively studied by law enforcement and 
financial regulatory authorities, and DVCs represent a challenge to well-established 
mechanisms employed by governments around the world to surveille and interdict TO 
financial activities. 
It is the goal of this thesis to determine whether recent developments in and around 
DVCs may be cause for a renewed investigation into the threat potential for TOs to use 
DVCs at scale. To accomplish this goal, Chapter III examines recent developments in scale 
of use and growth in value of DVCs, while Chapter IV deals exclusively with technological 
developments of newer DVCs, third-party fintech, and TO sophistication. These chapters 
focus on their respective changes in market developments and technological innovations 
that could affect, and potentially weaken, the four primary arguments on which the prior 
11 
research relied. Additionally, chapters III and IV examine how their respective 
developments could undermine the abilities of regulators and law enforcement to detect 
any increased use of DVCs, possibly increasing their potential to be exploited by TOs. 
Building on any potential weaknesses in regulatory and enforcement mechanisms 
that may be exacerbated by the developments explored in chapters III and IV, Chapter V, 
the final chapter of the thesis, presents findings and conclusions based on the evidence 
presented in the prior chapters. The homeland security enterprise already focuses a great 
deal of counterterrorism manpower and resources to stemming the flow of terror finance. 
However, TOs are quickly adapting and flexing to meet their financial needs as 
governments and institutions aggressively make the traditional financial system more 
difficult for them to access. As we succeed in applying pressure to that end, it is of 
paramount importance to the homeland security enterprise, and to the people of the United 
States, that as innovation and technology open new possible avenues for alternate terror 
financing methods, that our policy makers stay up to date on the threats posed by these 
innovations and understand them in lock-step with those who would wish to support or 
perpetrate an agenda of terror. 
12 
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II. BACKGROUND: VIRTUAL CURRENCY, CONTEMPORARY
TERROR FINANCE, AND THE REGULATIONS DESIGNED TO 
KEEP THEM SEPARATE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides relevant background on three interrelated subjects that are at 
the core of this thesis: the design features of virtual currencies that may make them 
attractive to TOs; contemporary terror finance (how terror networks leverage the existing 
global financial system to move and convert currency without surveillance by state 
authorities); and U.S. financial regulations that aim to reduce the risk of a nexus forming 
between TOs and DVCs. The three sections of this chapter provide a context for 
understanding the mechanisms of terror finance and how TOs might find DVCs a useful 
alternative to conventional financial transactions, subject to the regulations that are 
described in this chapter. Virtual currencies are not a new invention, and financial 
regulators have been grappling with how best to address the evolving challenge of this 
technology, which has proliferated in the recent years. A survey of existing policies and 
laws make it clear that state authorities that have responsibility for oversight and 
enforcement of the financial sector are only now coming to realize the challenge posed by 
DVCs, and that additional regulation—underpinned by technical capabilities—will be 
necessary in the future. 
B. THE DESIGN FEATURES OF DIGITAL VIRTUAL CURRENCIES 
According to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF),26 “Virtual currency is a 
digital representation of value that can be digitally traded and functions as (1) a medium of 
exchange; and/or (2) a unit of account; and/or (3) a store of value, but does not have legal 
26 FATF is regarded as the global leader in addressing AML/CFT issues, and the U.S. Department of 
the Treasury’s FinCEN broadly utilizes FATF’s guidance. As such, this thesis will attempt to adhere as 
closely as possible to key definitions and vocabulary used throughout both entities’ publications with the 
intent of providing some common language to help better understand how DVCs operate. 
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tender status.”27 Virtual currency does not count as legal tender, which is likely the most 
important distinction from real currency, or fiat currency, which FATF defines as, “the 
coin and paper money of a country that is designated as its legal tender; circulates; and is 
customarily used and accepted as a medium of exchange in the issuing country.”28 Fiat 
currency also includes digital representations of legal tender, sometimes referred to as e-
money, which may be used in electronic transfers.29 Within the financial sector both e-
money and virtual currency commonly fall under the broader category of digital currency; 
however, to prevent confusion, this thesis will not refer to e-money or digital currency and 
will only differentiate between fiat and virtual currency. 
Virtual currencies may be considered either convertible or non-convertible. FATF 
notes: “Convertible virtual currency has an equivalent value in real currency and can be 
exchanged back-and-forth for real currency,”30 whereas non-convertible virtual currency 
“is intended to be specific to a particular virtual domain or world,”31 such as the rewards 
points offered by commercial retailers or as may be used within online role-playing games. 
Lacking broad use in the global economy, TOs would likely find little or no utility in non-
convertible virtual currency, consequently, this thesis will focus solely on the convertible 
varieties.32 
Convertible virtual currency can finally be further divided into either centralized or 
de-centralized versions. Centralized virtual currencies rely on a single, controlling, 
administrative authority as a trusted third party that establishes the rules of a currency’s 
                                                 
27 FATF, “Virtual Currencies: Key Definitions and Potential AML/CFT Risks” (Paris: FATF, June 
2014), 4, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/methodsandtrends/documents/virtual-currency-definitions-
aml-cft-risk.html. 
28 FATF, 4. 
29 FATF, “Virtual Currencies: Key Definitions and Potential AML/CFT Risks.” 
30 FATF, 4. 
31 FATF, 4. 
32 “It should be noted that even where, under the terms set by the administrator, a non-convertible 
currency is officially transferrable only within a specific virtual environment and is not convertible, it is 
possible that an unofficial, secondary black market may arise that provides an opportunity to exchange the 
‘non-convertible’ virtual currency for fiat currency or another virtual currency. Development of a robust 
secondary black market in a particular ‘non-convertible’ virtual currency may, as a practical matter, 
effectively transform it into a convertible virtual currency. A non-convertible characterisation is thus not 
necessarily static.” FATF, 5. 
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use, maintains a single master ledger of transactions and accounts, and retains the authority 
to introduce or withdraw a currency from circulation.33 Examples of centralized virtual 
currencies include Second Life Linden Dollars, World of Warcraft Gold, airline frequent 
flyer miles, and numerous retail store reward points. Prior to some of the first regulatory 
efforts encompassing virtual currencies in 2013, the level of control they offered made 
centralized virtual currencies prone to money laundering and terror finance activity, as was 
the case with the examples of both Liberty Reserve and e-gold Ltd.34 However, it was the 
very existence of a central administrator, subject to the responsibility of ensuring 
compliance with AML/CFT regulation, that made these high-profile illicit-use cases 
relatively easy to pursue once regulatory or law enforcement authorities detected activity 
that met the threshold for an investigation. Consequently, centralized virtual currencies 
have become much less attractive to illicit actors compared to their de-centralized 
counterparts. Thus, this thesis focuses on the potential for TOs to exploit de-centralized 
virtual currency. 
DVCs, unlike virtual currencies that make use of a central ledger and an 
administrator, utilize a framework of math-based internal protocols that rely on 
cryptography and a system majority consensus for transaction validation.35 These systems 
are entirely decentralized: no single party maintains a ledger of transactions, and encrypted 
data is transmitted to populate decentralized ledgers housed on computers around the 
world. This reliance on cryptography is why DVCs are often referred to as cryptocurrency 
and is also what permits computational efforts by a broad and diffuse group of participants, 
known commonly as miners, to perform all necessary transaction validations.36 These 
miners earn newly created units of DVCs as a reward for their work to verify and record 
transactions onto the system’s publicly viewable distributed ledger. 
33 Goldman et al., “Terrorist Use of Virtual Currencies: Containing the Potential Threat.” 
34 In-depth explanations of enforcement actions against now defunct virtual currency administrators e-
gold Ltd. and Liberty Reserve are well-documented in sections III. and VI. B. in: Stephen T. Middlebrook 
and Sarah Jane Hughes, “Regulating Cryptocurrencies in the United States: Current Issues and Future 
Directions,” William Mitchell Law Review 40, no. 2 (2014): 813–48. 
35 FATF, “Virtual Currencies: Key Definitions and Potential AML/CFT Risks.” 
36 He et al., “Virtual Currencies and Beyond: Initial Considerations.” 
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This distributed ledger, often referred to as a blockchain, is a publicly shared record 
of all the transactions that have ever occurred within a given DVC system. Once 
cryptographically signed, new transactions are aggregated by system protocols into blocks 
to be validated by miners before being added to a timestamped chain of previously existing 
blocks.37 Identical copies of the blockchain are stored and shared on a peer-to-peer network 
of all computers that choose to run the publicly available software for a specific DVC.38 
Therefore, irreversible transactional security is ensured by majority consensus because, 
according to those who study blockchain technology like Alex Wilner, “any attempt to 
tamper with the blockchain would require the alteration of every block previously created, 
a near-impossibility given the decentralized nature of the technology.”39 
Publicly viewable DVC system addresses, which serve as account numbers, do not 
require names or any other type of identification to be attached to them to function in the 
system. Because, according to FATF, DVC protocols do “not require or provide 
identification and verification of participants or generate historical records of transactions 
that are necessarily associated with real world identity,”40 and with no central authority to 
monitor transactions and engage in AML/CFT reporting, DVC related investigations and 
asset seizure can become complicated for law enforcement.41 However, even though users’ 
identities may not be directly associated with their address(es), a complete and accurate 
history of all transactions associated with any and all addresses in the system are kept in 
public view on the blockchain.42 These two competing features result in transactions with 
more anonymity than can be expected with credit cards, online services, or other traditional 
payment remittance methods—but certainly less than would be associated with the use of 
                                                 
37 Ducas Evangeline and Alex Wilner, “The Security and Financial Implications of Blockchain 
Technologies: Regulating Emerging Technologies in Canada,” International Journal 72, no. 4 (2017): 538–
62, https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702017741909. 
38 Joshua Baron et al., National Security Implications of Virtual Currency-—Examining the Potential 
for Non-State Actor Deployment (RAND Corporation, 2015), https://doi.org/10.7249/j.ctt19rmd78. 
39 Evangeline and Wilner, “The Security and Financial Implications of Blockchain Technologies: 
Regulating Emerging Technologies in Canada,” 4. 
40 FATF, “Virtual Currencies: Key Definitions and Potential AML/CFT Risks,” 9. 
41 FATF, “Virtual Currencies: Key Definitions and Potential AML/CFT Risks.” 
42 He et al., “Virtual Currencies and Beyond: Initial Considerations.” 
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cash. Thus, DVCs are said to provide “pseudonymity,”43 rather than absolute 
“untraceability.”44 
C. CONTEMPORARY TERROR FINANCE 
All TOs—regardless of size, structure, motivations, or methods—must raise and 
move the financial means to turn terrorist plots into actions.45 TOs have exhibited great 
flexibility and variety in their funding methods and have proven that they are willing to use 
any and all means to raise and move money to support their agendas.46 According to 
Maruyama and Hallahan of the Center for a New American Security, contemporary terror 
financing methods are “constantly evolving to avoid the restrictions imposed by 
governments, intergovernmental organizations, and the international financial system.”47 
Some of the more notable methods of raising money for and among TOs include: 
private donations, abuse and misuse of non-profit organizations, smuggling, drug 
trafficking, kidnapping for ransom, exploitation of natural resources, control of banks, 
involuntary extraction from local populations, legitimate commercial enterprise, and state 
sponsorship.48 FATF’s reports found that fully one third of all cases and prosecutions of 
terror financing in the United States since 2001 “involved direct financial support from 
individuals to terrorist networks.”49 
Regardless of how TOs acquire the money they raise, it must be moved and/or 
spent, often internationally, to facilitate and coordinate operations, create propaganda, 
successfully recruit new members, train and equip existing members, pay the salaries of 
members and leadership, and even provide social services to members and local 
43 Carlisle, “Virtual Currencies and Financial Crime: Challenges and Opportunities,” 9. 
44 Thibault de Balthasar and Julio C. Hernandez -Castro, “An Analysis of Bitcoin Laundry 
Services,”  in NordSec2017—Nordic Conference on Secure IT Systems, 8-10 Nov 2017, Tartu, Estonia 
(2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70290-2_18.2017, 23. 
45 FATF, “Emerging Terrorist Financing Risks” (Paris: FATF, 2015), www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/methodsandtrends/documents/emerging-terrorist-financing-risks.html. 
46 Goldman et al., “Terrorist Use of Virtual Currencies: Containing the Potential Threat.” 
47 Maruyama and Hallahan, “Following the Money: A Primer on Terrorist Financing,” 2. 
48 FATF, “Emerging Terrorist Financing Risks.” 
49 FATF, 13. 
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populations.50 Terrorists today continue to rely primarily on traditional methods of moving 
money including services from banks within the formal banking sector, informal money 
value transfer systems (MVTS) like hawala networks, or such MSBs as Western Union, as 
well as the physical transportation of cash.51 Indeed, while cash remains the simplest and 
most widely used method of purchasing goods and services within local economies, 
moving money across international borders in quantities sufficient to fund large-scale TOs 
is increasingly making the use of bulk cash impractical.52 Thus, TOs have shown a 
willingness to delve into NPPS like prepaid cards and Internet-based payment systems, 
including DVCs, especially considering the increased anonymity, global reach, and faster 
speed these types of transactions can offer.53 
As DVCs—the most well-known of which is Bitcoin—attract increasing attention 
from financial institutions (FIs), governments, and the general public, two narratives have 
taken shape. The first holds that DVCs represent an important innovation in the future of 
legitimate global payment products and services; the second, that DVCs represent a 
powerful new method for criminals, terrorist financiers, and sanctions-evaders to store and 
move money outside the reach of law enforcement and financial regulators.54 
Indeed, a small minority of governments, with little appetite for complex financial 
innovations, have wholly banned DVCs as a potentially disruptive technology—acting on 
the latter narrative, or in response to the destabilizing effect DVCs can have on local 
economies (either because of the demand for electricity, which has the effect of driving up 
production costs and rates when miners are operating at scale, or because of the inflationary 
risks that come with price instability). Though such states as Russia and Bolivia have 
entirely disallowed the use of DVCs within their borders, after weighing the risks versus 
the potential benefits, the United States—and most states with well-developed financial 
infrastructures—have tentatively and cautiously developed some form of regulatory 
                                                 
50 FATF, “Emerging Terrorist Financing Risks.” 
51 FATF. 
52 Goldman et al., “Terrorist Use of Virtual Currencies: Containing the Potential Threat.” 
53 Goldman et al. 
54 FATF, “Virtual Currencies: Key Definitions and Potential AML/CFT Risks.” 
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enforcement and oversight capability in their approach to incorporating DVCs into the 
broader economy.55 
D. EXISTING AML/CFT REGULATIONS 
Illicit actors’ potential use of early centralized virtual currencies for money 
laundering has been a concern of some of the world’s largest financial institutions since at 
least 1996. In that year, a virtual currency offering, e-gold, appeared and was immediately 
subject to investigation and review by AML authorities.56 Now defunct, e-gold nonetheless 
demonstrated that virtual currency could appeal to both mainstream investors and those 
seeking to use the currency for illicit purposes.57 Early abuse of virtual currencies like e-
gold forced regulators to add them to the language of existing AML/CFT policy, adding to 
the patchwork of financial sector laws and regulations that are still relied on today, either 
to rein in NPPS like DVCs, or shut them down when illicit use is suspected or discovered.58 
According to the IMF, money laundering involves processing funds generated by 
criminal means in an effort to shroud any links between the funds and their illegal origin, 
while terrorism financing, a specific and separate issue, deals exclusively with raising 
money to support terrorist activity.59 Though these two distinct and long existing issues 
have many differences, they often deal with very similar vulnerabilities in financial systems 
that allow transactions to occur anonymously or with an undesirable level of opacity.60 
Many tools and regulations designed to stave off both issues have seen significant 
modification and edits in order to be inclusive of the rapidly evolving landscape of NPPS, 
55 He et al., “Virtual Currencies and Beyond: Initial Considerations.” 
56 Though regulators had monitored e-gold Ltd. since its inception in 1996, the federal government 
built their case for nine years before bringing charges against its administrators in 2007. In-depth detail of 
enforcement actions against the administrators of now defunct virtual currency e-gold Ltd. are well-
documented in section III. in: Middlebrook and Hughes, “Regulating Cryptocurrencies in the United States: 
Current Issues and Future Directions.” 
57 Middlebrook and Hughes. 
58 Middlebrook and Hughes; HSSAI, “Risks and Threats of Cryptocurrencies.” 
59 International Monetary Fund, “Factsheet: The IMF and the Fight Against Money Laundering and the 
Financing of Terrorism,” October 30, 2017, 
https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/16/31/Fight-Against-Money-Laundering-the-
Financing-of-Terrorism. 
60 International Monetary Fund. 
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however, these methods continue to struggle to stay ahead of the innovations that illicit 
actors and terrorists exploit.61 And while virtual currencies are not new, per-se, the 
AML/CFT regulations that the United States relies on to detect and prevent their illicit use 
are significantly older by comparison and likely in need of serious revision to remain 
wholly applicable to such a rapidly evolving technology. 
 The BSA of 1970, combined with the Money Laundering Control Act of 
1986, and Title III of the USAPATRIOT Act of 2001, form the core of U.S. AML/CFT 
laws and regulations. This combination of regulations, as applied to banks and FIs, 
established requirements for suspicious transaction reporting, recordkeeping, and perhaps 
most notably, standards for identifying individuals participating in transactions, often 
referred to as know-your-customer (KYC) requirements.62 However, on the heels of a 
growing number of headlines regarding criminal activity and money laundering involving 
the use of DVCs, these KYC requirements (last updated in 2001) drew increased 
attention—and some ire—from DVCs’ proponents like developers and users, as well as 
more skeptical government leaders and financial institutions the world over.63 Proponents 
of DVCs lament KYC requirements because they stifle anonymity—one of the primary 
libertarian motivations behind the original design of DVCs—while according to Jared 
Kleiman, many LEAs and policy makers argue that current KYC requirements do not go 
far enough and instead allow continue to allow DVCs to be utilized with sufficient 
anonymity that it creates “a means to transfer, launder, or steal funds as well as a means of 
making donations to groups participating in illegal activities.”64 
Especially following the rise of more organized terror groups like Al Qaida and 
ISIS, a renewed fervor over AML/CFT concerns made it apparent that clearer definitional 
and regulatory guidance would benefit those seeking more widespread adoption of 
                                                 
61 Maruyama and Hallahan, “Following the Money: A Primer on Terrorist Financing.” 
62 Victor Dostov and Pavel Shust, “Cryptocurrencies: An Unconventional Challenge to the AML/CFT 
Regulators?,” Journal of Financial Crime 21, no. 3 (2014): 249–63, https://doi.org/10.1108/JFC-06-2013-
0043. 
63 Kleiman, “Beyond the Silk Road: Unregulated Decentralized Virtual Currencies Continue to 
Endanger U.S. National Security and Welfare.” 
64 Kleiman, 74. 
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developing fintech as well as ease the fears of those seeking to govern its use. Thus, in 
2013, responding to calls for regulatory updates or clarifications, FinCEN released 
guidance that defined how the U.S. government would choose to align developers, 
exchangers, and users of DVCs into the framework of the BSA.65 Shortly after the release 
of FinCEN’s guidance, FATF released two reports; one in 2014 specifically addressing key 
definitions and the AML/CFT risks of virtual currencies, and another in early 2015 
recommending a risk-based approach (RBA) for virtual currencies to FIs.66 FinCEN and 
the BSA closely adhere to FATF’s RBA, however, because these recommendations are 
non-binding, several other governments have taken very different actions to manage the 
use of DVCs because an outright ban of their use is untenable. This permissiveness 
complicates the enforcement of cross-border AML/CFT efforts between governments.67 
The Bank Secrecy Act establishes requirements primarily for traditional banks as 
well as such MSBs as foreign currency exchanges and money transmitters. The current 
applicability of U.S. AML/CFT regulations to DVCs, therefore, relies on FinCEN having 
identified certain participants in the DVC ecosystem as MSBs. FinCEN determined in its 
2013 guidance, and later in follow-on clarification efforts, that participants in the virtual 
currency ecosystem fall into one of three categories: users, administrators, and 
exchangers.68 Following four administrative rulings intended to clarify their initial 
guidance, FinCEN currently defines a DVC exchanger as “a person engaged as a business 
in the exchange of virtual currency for [fiat] currency, funds, or other virtual currency,”69 
65 FinCEN, “Guidance: Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, 
or Using Virtual Currencies,” Guidance (U.S. Department of the Treasury, March 18, 2013), 
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FIN-2013-G001.pdf. 
66 FATF, “Virtual Currencies: Key Definitions and Potential AML/CFT Risks”; FATF, “Guidance for 
a Risk-Based Approach to Virtual Currencies” (Paris: FATF, June 2015), http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/fatfgeneral/documents/guidance-rba-virtual-currencies.html. 
67 An excellent summary of DVC regulation by nations other than the United States is available in 
section II. D. in: Sarah Hughes and Stephen Middlebrook, “Advancing a Framework for Regulating 
Cryptocurrency Payments Intermediaries,” Yale Journal on Regulation 32, no. 2 (2015): 495–559. 
68 FinCEN, “Guidance: Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, 
or Using Virtual Currencies”; Dostov and Shust, “Cryptocurrencies: An Unconventional Challenge to the 
AML/CFT Regulators?” 
69 Dostov and Shust, “Cryptocurrencies: An Unconventional Challenge to the AML/CFT Regulators?,” 
11.
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leaving all others who transact in DVCs—not engaged as a business—defined simply as 
users. While users are the only category of the three not subject to BSA requirements, 
because DVCs lack any administrator by FinCEN’s definition, at the time of this writing 
only DVC exchangers are required to register as a MSB.70 In alignment with FATF’s RBA, 
FinCEN’s decision to only identify exchangers as MSBs—and thus make them the only 
DVC participants subject to the BSA—seems to agree with the IMF’s position “that the 
most significant [AML/CFT] risks are concentrated in points of intersection between 
[virtual currencies] and the regulated fiat currency financial system. As such, it has only 
called for the regulation of…exchanges…that operate as ‘gatekeepers’ with the regulated 
fiat currency financial system.”71 
E. CONCLUSION 
Digital virtual currencies are appealing to any individual or group that seeks to 
obscure the movement of funds across borders. TOs are especially interested in this kind 
of capability and have demonstrated the ability to take advantage of weaknesses in financial 
regulatory and oversight regimes by adopting new financial products and services. Virtual 
currencies can be understood as an innovative financial product that includes features to 
anonymize the locations and identities of parties to a transaction, and a review of existing 
government regulations written to monitor DVCs for AML/CFT abuse make it clear that 
the existing regimes for oversight and enforcement are relatively weak. Current U.S. laws 
and regulations are focused only on registered DVC exchangers to ensure BSA 
compliance. Thus, any changes to DVC technology, or to the tools and markets that support 
their use, that further enhance the anonymity of exchangers and alleviate their obligation 
to register with FinCEN as MSBs, may lead to both exchangers and users of these 
exchanges operating outside the scope of current regulatory oversight. This fact means that 
governments around the world that have an interest in KYC/AML and terror finance must 
respond quickly to the rapid innovation that is taking place in the financial services sector. 
                                                 
70 Goldman et al., “Terrorist Use of Virtual Currencies: Containing the Potential Threat.” 
71 He et al., “Virtual Currencies and Beyond: Initial Considerations,” 27. 
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The fact that the regulatory regime for these exchanges—and the currencies that 
are traded—are so weak is symptomatic of a larger problem: assumptions that regulatory 
authorities have made about the scalability, appeal, and speculative value of DVCs. The 
next chapter of this thesis examines these assumptions and demonstrates conclusively that 
there is considerable public interest in virtual currencies, and that the explosion of DVC 
offerings is a challenge that must be faced by regulators and LEAs who must become more 
responsive to the possibility that TOs will employ both DVCs and unregistered exchanges 
in the near future. 
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III. MARKET SIZE AND COMMERCIAL ACCEPTANCE
SWELLS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Many prior AML/CFT risk assessments cite the need for significant growth of the 
relatively small DVC market as a primary limiting factor to the widespread use and 
adoption of DVCs by TOs. Broadly, the size or scale of the DVC market can be viewed as 
a limiting factor because it determines how easily and reliably DVCs can be converted to 
or from fiat currency, and/or how easily DVCs can be spent directly on goods and services 
in the general economy. Convertibility relies on sufficient liquidity, the ability of the 
market to support a large volume of transactions, as well as on sufficient market 
capitalization (market cap), the overall value invested in the market, to ensure the 
magnitude of currency required for large transactions is available. As the DVC market 
grows in size and scale, commercial interest attracts investment capital to fintech 
developers who create new applications and user interfaces designed to make DVCs easier 
to use, expanding and strengthening the support network intended to increase direct 
spending of DVCs in the general economy.72 As previously mentioned, if the number of 
direct spending transactions using DVCs grows, so too does the parallel economy that 
exists outside the scope of current regulations, potentially making DVCs more attractive to 
illicit actors.73 
Though prior assessments do not attempt to quantify what market size, level of 
commercial acceptance, or rate of growth should be considered a potential threat, they 
instead offer expected values for these data sets for the next several years. To determine if 
these values should reasonably be considered significant, this chapter examines some of 
the DVC market size statistics, figures, and expected rates of growth cited in recent low 
threat reports and compares them to current data to establish a position that, indeed, growth 
in all areas of market size, commercial use, and investment interest should reasonably be 
72 Goldman et al., “Terrorist Use of Virtual Currencies: Containing the Potential Threat.” 
73 He et al., “Virtual Currencies and Beyond: Initial Considerations.” 
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considered significant. More specifically, this chapter argues that a recent rapid rise in 
value has led to a significant increase in DVC market cap and liquidity and has attracted a 
sudden influx of investment capital into the DVC ecosystem that has resulted in its 
increased commercial use. Indeed, in a very short period of time following the most recent 
2017 assessments of TO interest in DVCs, due to the incredible growth of the overall 
market size and increased commercial acceptance, DVCs may now be more likely to attract 
TOs, and arguments that TOs are unlikely to adopt DVCs due to these limitations may no 
longer be valid. 
B. GROWTH IN DVC MARKET CAPITALIZATIONS AND LIQUIDITY 
David Cohen, the Obama Administration’s Under Secretary of Terrorism and 
Financial Intelligence, U.S. Department of the Treasury, is quoted in a 2014 HSSAI report 
as saying that “we do not currently see widespread use of virtual currencies as a means of 
terrorist finance,” in part, due to “its low capitalization and liquidity.”74 This same report 
cites an estimate from the same year that the total DVC market cap could likely “grow by 
14 percent…topping $55.4 billion by 2017.”75 Comparatively, more recent data shows the 
total market cap of virtual currencies exceeded DHS’s estimate by more than 1000 percent; 
in 2017 it peaked at more than $590 billion before declining rapidly to end the year, but 
then climbed beyond $800 billion just two weeks later.76 Similarly, HSSAI cites data from 
CoinDesk in late 2014, regarding the astounding rate of growth in venture capital 
investment in virtual currencies at that time: “The amount of money invested…has 
increased significantly, from about $2 million in 2012 to…more than $250 million so far 
in 2014, representing an increase of more than 12,000 percent in three years.”77 More 
recently, venture capital investment in DVC related fintech has already exceeded $1.15 
billion so far in 2018, representing an increase of more than 57,000 percent over the six 
                                                 
74 HSSAI, “Risks and Threats of Cryptocurrencies,” 108. 
75 HSSAI, 23. 
76 “Historical Snapshots,” CoinMarketCap, 2018, https://coinmarketcap.com/historical/. 
77 HSSAI, “Risks and Threats of Cryptocurrencies,” 16. 
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years since 2012, which shows that general interest in growing the scale, capitalization, 
and liquidity in DVC markets shows no sign of slowing.78 
As noted, as recently as March 20, 2017, Zachary Goldman et al. indicated that 
DVCs lacked useful scale to support large TOs when they stated that the market cap of the 
oldest and most widely known and utilized DVC, Bitcoin, was roughly $17 billion, while 
such newer, more anonymous DVCs as Monero and ZCash had market caps of $340 
million and $22 million, respectively.79 Goldman et al. contrasted these figures to the U.S. 
government’s estimate that TOs’ “illicit financing generates $300 billion per year,”80 
suggesting that the total market cap of these three popular DVCs do not possess the scale 
needed to support the movement of TOs’ illicit finance proceeds in totality. However, again 
illustrating the unprecedented exponential growth experienced by the overall DVC market 
in 2017, just nine months later at the end of 2017, Bitcoin’s market cap exceeded $327 
billion, while Monero and ZCash grew to $5.4 billion and $1.4 billion, respectively.81 This 
data suggests that the market cap of these three DVCs alone could potentially more than 
support annual TOs’ illicit finance requirements—and these three big players are only three 
of more than 1600 DVCs in the market at the time of this writing. Additionally, this data 
indicates subject matter experts misjudged the potential of DVC markets and regulators 
may have underestimated the broad appeal of DVCs. 
Commanding more than 37 percent of the total DVC market to date, the original 
and oldest DVC, Bitcoin, is one of the few for which current and historical transactional 
data is readily available.82 At the time of this writing, Bitcoin typically processes an 
average of 250 million transactions daily, and the underlying distributed ledger system is 
capable of supporting a peak capacity of nearly 500 million.83 This transactional capacity 
78 “Bitcoin Venture Capital,” CoinDesk, accessed May 11, 2018, https://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-
venture-capital/. 
79 Goldman et al., “Terrorist Use of Virtual Currencies: Containing the Potential Threat.” 
80 Goldman et al., 18. 
81 “Cryptocurrency Market Capitalizations.” 
82 “Cryptocurrency Market Capitalizations.” 
83 “Bitcoin Charts,” Blockchain, accessed May 12, 2018, https://blockchain.info/charts. 
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equates to a single DVC with the potential to account for up to one third of the roughly 1.4 
billion daily non-cash transactions occurring worldwide.84 Again, though no specific 
threshold was established by prior research as to how much growth would bring DVCs to 
a scale considered to be a serious AML/CFT threat, it could be irresponsible not to take 
notice of this recent explosive growth trend and weigh the need for re-examination. 
C. COMMERCIAL ACCEPTANCE AND NETWORK GROWTH 
The primary reason for DVC market growth has not been attributable to its ease of 
use or a sudden wave of retail DVC spending. Instead, much of the meteoric rise in the 
total market cap and liquidity of DVCs is most likely attributed to the rise in popularity of 
investing in and speculating on its future value.85 Still, the growing commercial and retail 
context in which users can transact in DVCs should not be ignored by those evaluating the 
growth of the DVC network since these characteristics tend to improve a payment 
product’s ease of use—expanding the user base and the parallel DVC economy—more so 
than the overall size of the market, making it more accessible to legitimate consumers and 
illicit actors alike. 
Though DVC payment systems still lag other more common forms of payment due 
to barriers created by limited retail acceptance and the complexity involved with obtaining 
and spending DVCs, great strides are being made in these areas. As an example of the 
growing retail use of DVCs, Marija Odineca at CoinTelegraph reports that the number of 
retailers accepting DVCs for payment in 2015 stood at just more than 7,000, while today 
more than 100,000 merchants now accept DVCs, including large well-known merchants 
like Amazon, Overstock, Microsoft, Expedia, and Subway.86 However, DVC payment 
services can still only reach these larger retail and commercial audiences if the DVC 
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support network continues to grow and evolve to make obtaining and using DVCs more 
commonplace and convenient. Generally, consumers are not willing to attend a conference, 
read a tutorial, or watch a YouTube video—as was once a common requirement for first 
time users—to figure out how to buy a cup of coffee with Bitcoin, and so, it could be 
presumed that many TOs might not be willing to delve into the complexities of transacting 
in DVCs.87 Indeed, even as commercial use of DVCs gains popularity and the numbers of 
full-service brokerages and exchanges have swelled to nearly 11,000, until recently, 
understanding, acquiring, and using DVCs remained too great a barrier to many people.88 
To reach a larger audience, new technologies, services, and businesses have been 
created to begin to overcome the “complication barrier” and have begun integrating DVCs 
into more familiar forms of use through the proliferation of ATMs and smart phone 
applications in place of the—at times complex—desk-top computer programs once 
required to transact in DVCs. According to HSSAI, in July of 2014, there were just more 
than 120 DVC ATMs worldwide, designed to facilitate the exchange of fiat currency for 
Bitcoin.89 By comparison, today there are more than 6,000 ATMs globally that service 
eight popular DVCs and the rate of new world-wide installations has reached nearly eight 
units per day.90 Additionally, while early users of Bitcoin could only choose to store their 
private cryptographic keys (required to initiate and authorize transactions) in either paper 
wallets, downloadable computer software, or stand-alone hardware similar to USB thumb 
drives, smart phone wallet apps have been developed to bring ease of use for all DVCs to 
mobile networks and anyone who can use a modern cell phone.91 At the end of 2017 there 
were more than 2,000 smart-phone applications on Google Play alone designed to enable 
fast and easy transactions between users, banks, merchants, exchanges, and all other types 
87 HSSAI, “Risks and Threats of Cryptocurrencies.” 
88 “Cryptocurrency Market Capitalizations.” 
89 HSSAI, “Risks and Threats of Cryptocurrencies.” 
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of wallets, with a more familiar interface, greatly expanding the possible DVC user base 
and nearly eliminating any complexities to obtaining and spending DVCs easily.92 
At the beginning of 2018, some of the top DVC exchanges were adding 100,000 
new users per day; unfortunately, not all of these new users, nor all recent DVC market 
growth can be attributed to legitimate commercial and retail networks.93 The increase in 
DVCs’ popularity for illegal purposes within criminal networks must also be accounted 
for. Cybercriminals and TCOs are in fact making use of DVCs on a significant scale.94 
Indeed, in an assessment from 2017, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) stated that 
“TCOs are…increasingly using virtual currencies due to their anonymizing nature and ease 
of use. Bitcoin is the most common form of payment for drug sales on dark net 
marketplaces and is emerging as a desirable method to transfer illicit drug proceeds 
internationally. Bitcoin is the most widely used virtual currency due to its longevity and 
growing acceptance at legitimate businesses and institutions worldwide.”95 
Though this thesis and previous research keeps TOs, cybercriminals, and TCOs in 
distinctly different categories when assessing their individual scales of DVC use, when 
establishing the overall rise of DVC use cases and total market growth, it becomes difficult 
to ignore that both TOs and TCOs engage in drug trafficking, kidnapping for ransom, and 
money laundering associated with these activities. It is at the very least interesting to note 
that the U.S. House Homeland Security Committee has stated that “Terror financing 
experts assess that criminality and Islamist extremism are increasingly interconnected; ISIS 
actively seeks recruits with skills such as robbery and drug-dealing, that assist the group’s 
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overall mission. One expert on Islamist radicalization has described jihadists’ connections 
to criminality as ‘an operational aspect of the Islamic State.’”96 
Regardless of exactly who or what groups are responsible for the growth of the 
DVC market and its associated networks, tools, and technology, clearly the broader DVC 
ecosystem is growing, but will it now pose a greater threat? What we can safely surmise is 
that a growing commercial market, increasing acceptance of retail DVC point-of-sale 
transactions, an expanding illicit user base, and private peer-to-peer transactions all serve 
to decrease the need for TOs to exchange DVCs for fiat currency in order to conduct 
transactions in the general economy. Consequently, as this parallel virtual economy grows, 
eliminating the need to cash out DVCs for fiat currency, more and more transactions will 
inherently circumvent the narrow scope of AML/CFT scrutiny provided by licensed 
exchanges and MSBs. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The evidence presented in this chapter illustrates conclusively: the overall size of 
the DVC market has grown well beyond the expectations of both private and government 
subject matter experts; and commercial interest and acceptance of DVCs by a growing user 
base has exploded and shows little evidence of slowing. Though prior research did not 
attempt to establish any quantitative or qualitative goal posts for conditions or values at 
which they would no longer consider the limited market size and commercial acceptance 
of DVCs as barriers to TOs’ interest or adoption, the rate of change of both factors has 
been significant enough to consider whether these two limiting factors may be nullified. 
Regardless, the next chapter will explore recent changes in the remaining two factors cited 
by researchers as barriers to adoption of DVCs by TOs: insufficient anonymity and the 
perceived lack of technological sophistication of TOs. 
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IV. GREATER ANONYMITY AND TECHNOLOGICAL
SOPHISTICATION OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter addressed changes in market size and commercial acceptance 
of DVCs, undermining assumptions that these characteristics would limit TO adoption. 
The remaining assumptions to be addressed in this chapter are epitomized by the 
assessment of Goldman et al. who stated that, “without securing anonymity and increasing 
technological sophistication, systematic use of Bitcoin by terrorists remains unlikely.”97 
Indeed, if Bitcoin were the only DVC at issue, this thesis could offer little in the way of 
rebuttal. However, due to recent developments in newer, more anonymous DVC 
technology, according to Olga Kharif, “Bitcoin is losing its luster with some of its earliest 
and most avid fans—criminals—giving rise to a new breed of virtual currency.”98 
Furthermore, TOs are making strides in gaining technological sophistication while 
advancements in ease of use continue to lower technological barriers to utilizing DVCs. 
The first segment of this chapter will address recent developments in anonymizing 
fintech fueled by an apparent arms race between privacy advocate DVC developers and 
LEAs determined to maintain or regain their ability to investigate, identify, and gather 
evidence against those who might use DVCs for nefarious purposes, including TOs. 
Additionally, as asserted by Goldman et al., developments in greater anonymity alone are 
unlikely to make DVCs more attractive to TOs if the technology remains too complicated 
to use for persons or groups who may have limited Internet access or limited technological 
sophistication. Thus, the second segment of this chapter addresses evidence that TO 
technological sophistication is on the rise, and, thanks in large part to the growth of 
commercial acceptance addressed in previous chapters, DVCs are increasingly easier to 
use. 
97 Goldman et al., “Terrorist Use of Virtual Currencies: Containing the Potential Threat,” 24. 
98 Olga Kharif, “The Criminal Underworld Is Dropping Bitcoin for Another Currency,” Bloomberg, 
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B. DEVELOPMENTS IN ANONYMIZING FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY 
During its infancy, Bitcoin appealed to those seeking privacy for both legitimate 
and illicit purposes because it was thought to offer greater anonymity than most traditional 
financial mechanisms. However, following several high-profile criminal prosecutions 
involving the use of Bitcoin, it became clear that law enforcement agencies had developed 
the means to follow the money through the known design limitations of the publicly 
viewable blockchain. As David Carlisle points out in his assessment for RUSI, “Law 
enforcement agencies are able to use a variety of new forensic techniques and tools 
alongside their traditional investigative methods to analyse and follow illicit flows of 
Bitcoin in support of criminal investigations.”99 However, encouraged by the recent and 
rapid influx of billions of dollars into the DVC market, developers are investing huge sums 
of capital into creating and marketing new anonymizing fintech aimed at consumers who 
value their privacy. 
Developments in DVC related fintech include but are not limited to: third-party 
browser and IP address anonymizing software designed to complicate or completely 
obfuscate the location and identity of Internet users; the development and proliferation of 
private online marketplaces hidden from public view on the unindexed Internet, often 
referred to as dark web markets (DWMs); DVC privacy-enhancing tools designed to be 
used with existing DVCs; and finally, newly designed DVCs enabled with greater or total 
anonymity. This section discusses these developments individually but also illustrate how 
each of them build on one another to provide an enhanced level of anonymity that may 
prove sufficient to rebut arguments that DVCs cannot be made anonymous enough to 
attract the use of TOs. 
1. Anonymizing Software 
The reason for the development and use of anonymizing third-party software is best 
illustrated by David Carlisle, citing cryptocurrency researcher Malte Möser, who stated: 
“AML in Bitcoin has to deal with imperfect knowledge of identities, but may exploit 
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perfect knowledge of all transactions.”100 Specifically, Möser meant that if anyone looking 
closely enough manages to connect someone’s real identity to a specific DVC address or 
wallet, then that person’s complete transaction history is viewable—for example, to 
authorities.101 Revelations that the Bitcoin blockchain was not as infallible as was 
originally believed arose quickly after the 2013 arrest of Ross Ulbricht, the alleged 
mastermind behind the DWM known as The Silk Road,102 and doubly so following the 
more recent 2017 arrests of the administrators of AlphaBay and Hansa Market, the most 
popular successors to the Silk Road.103 Indeed, most DVC users have learned that the 
publicly viewable distributed ledger protocols underlying many of the most popular DVCs 
present a weakness that requires those seeking greater or total transactional anonymity to 
take additional precautions to safeguard their online identities. 
One such effort to complicate an outside party’s ability to follow DVC transaction 
histories involves the common practice of creating a new and unique public address for 
each and every individual transaction. However, though the ability to create an infinite 
number of new DVC wallets or addresses can make identifying a user more difficult, if 
investigators can determine the actual location of the device or physical address from which 
a user accesses the network, linking that device or location to a group or individual with 
any number of wallets or addresses becomes possible with enough effort through law 
enforcement’s investigation of Internet protocol (IP) traffic analysis.104 Therefore, if 
blockchain transaction histories can provide investigators with a perfect reconstruction of 
how much was transacted when, then protecting information regarding what was purchased 
from where or from which device, becomes crucial to maintaining the anonymity of who 
100 Carlisle, 9. 
101 Carlisle, 9. 
102 Details of the FBI’s investigation, arrest, and prosecution of Ross Ulbricht are described in detail in 
section I.A.2. in: Nicole S. Healy and Emily N. Christiansen, “Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-
Terrorist Finance,” ABA/Section of International Law Year in Review 50 (June 2016): 426–38. 
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Hansa Market are detailed in: Nathaniel Popper and Rebecca R. Ruiz, “Authorities Shut Down Two 
Markets On Dark Net,” The New York Times, July 20, 2017, sec. A. 
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is transacting online. Disguising or complicating the where and the who of online activity 
is precisely the function of third-party anonymizing software. 
To obscure a user’s online activity, especially the where and the who, free and such 
publicly available browser applications as the Tor Browser from The Tor Project Inc. 
(formerly known as the The Onion Router) can be used by anyone with a computer to 
anonymize their IP address, and thus their location and identity.105 According to the Tor 
Project’s website, “Tor protects you by bouncing your communications around a 
distributed network of relays run by volunteers all around the world: it prevents somebody 
watching your Internet connection from learning what sites you visit, and it prevents the 
sites you visit from learning your physical location.”106 Tor is not the only browser or 
software designed to permit Internet anonymity and prohibit network tracking by 
investigators, but it is one of the oldest and most used, listed as an essential privacy 
enhancement tool by many privacy and fintech-centric forums and websites.107 Indeed, 
since Tor’s inception in the early 1990s, a number of both licit and illicit groups and 
individuals—from smugglers and drug dealers to LEAs and news reporters--have used the 
technology to establish encrypted and anonymous websites protected from monitoring and 
tracking by outside entities.108 
2. Dark Web Markets 
Anonymizing technology like Tor is essential for illicit actors to establish and 
access anonymous networks located on the unindexed Internet, or deep web. The deep 
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web—which is not searchable or indexed by traditional search engines like Google or 
Bing—comprises as much as 96 percent of the total World Wide Web, according to 
estimates provided by one black market enthusiast website.109 Primarily home to legitimate 
private corporate networks and other password protected sites designed specifically to 
provide secure communications and identity protection to users, the illicit side of the deep 
web is often referred to as the dark web. 
The dark web is only accessible through the use of anonymizing software like Tor 
and requires users to know the specific web address of the site they intend to access, some 
of which change their address frequently and only post the latest dynamic address in 
heavily vetted, by-invitation-only, password protected forums and chat rooms.110 It is here, 
in the lowest reaches of the dark web, where users can set up and access any one of several 
hundred DWMs for weapons, drugs, hitmen, explosives, stolen intelligence, financial data, 
human trafficking, and a near limitless range of black market goods and services, all 
anonymous and encrypted—and almost exclusively leveraging DVCs for transactions. 
In addition to weapons, explosives, and other goods that TOs could choose to 
purchase anonymously directly from a DWM for the purpose of conducting attacks, a 
growing number of hidden, unlicensed, peer-to-peer (P2P) DVC exchanges on the dark 
web enable illicit actors to circumvent the AML/CFT protections placed on publicly 
utilized, legitimate DVC markets and exchanges. These secretive DWMs and unlicensed 
P2P DVC exchanges, which only exist with the successful use of anonymizing software, 
complicate AML/CFT regulation enforcement because they render exchange 
administrators, the only entities currently obligated with KYC and AML/CFT compliance, 
completely anonymous. As a result, even though the blockchain’s exposed history allows 
LEAs to see that DVC has appeared in or been transferred from DVC wallets or addresses, 
if parties purchase DVCs in exchange for fiat currency through anonymous P2P exchanges, 
no identifying information will likely be forthcoming from an illegal exchange’s 
109 “The Weird and Wonderful Deep Web,” Dark Web News, accessed May 20, 2018, 
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administrators. LEAs would be unable to determine ownership of the exchange for 
enforcement actions due to the use of anonymizing software.111 
As legitimate AML/CFT compliance becomes more complex and costlier for 
smaller businesses hoping to ride the wave of DVC exchange profitability, these businesses 
are increasingly apt to choose to operate under the shroud of DWMs where AML/CFT 
compliance is all but impossible to enforce. Though, the exact numbers of unlicensed 
exchanges operating within DWMs is unknown due to their inaccessibility to most 
researchers, according to a 2018 study by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies 
Center on Sanctions & Illicit Finance, “Darknet Markets are [a] key source of illicit funds,” 
and “[t]he number of illicit entities sending bitcoins to conversion services has risen over 
time.”112 The study revealed a 500-percent increase in entities involved in the laundering 
of Bitcoin over a three-year period and notes: “Illicit activity originated overwhelmingly 
from darknet marketplaces.”113 Though the study’s authors are quick to point out that the 
overall illicit use of Bitcoin specifically appears to be on the decline, they further illustrate 
the concentration of DVC launderers within DWMs when they note, “Nine of…102 illicit 
entities were the source of more than 95 percent of all laundered bitcoins in our study. All 
nine were darknet marketplaces.”114 
3. Privacy-Enhancing Tools for Early DVCs 
In addition to supporting unlicensed P2P DVC exchanges and a variety of other 
nefarious goods and services, according to Ducas Evangeline and Alex Wilner, DWMs 
accessed through anonymizing software also “support a host of privacy enhancing tools 
known as ‘tumblers’ and ‘mixers,’ which can obscure value ownership and transaction 
histories on blockchain ledgers, rendering them highly vulnerable to abuse for money 
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laundering and other forms of financial crime.”115 These types of tools are designed to 
enhance the security and anonymity of Bitcoin, and other early DVCs built on its 
underpinning basic protocols, since LEAs and the security research community have 
demonstrated an ability to analyze these early blockchains using transaction times, 
amounts, and patterns of use.116 
Brill and Keene explain in the Defense Against Terrorism Review that tumblers are 
designed to enhance the privacy of DVC transactions by sending “payments through a 
complex, semi-random series of dummy transactions”117 that complicate and obscure the 
link between wallets or addresses involved in transactions, “making it fruitless to use the 
‘Blockchain’ to follow the money trail involved in the transaction.”118 Mixers, by 
comparison, attempt to anonymize transactions by aggregating multiple real transactions 
of varying quantities into larger third-party transactions that are then dispersed by this third 
party, for a fee, to the actual intended recipients using newly created addresses.119 Because 
most DVC tracking efforts rely on matching transaction amounts with a specific time and 
address on the blockchain, these services obfuscate the true individual transaction amounts 
and make it more difficult to trace transactions to individual addresses or wallets.120 
Some new DVC electronic wallet services provide multiple layers of anonymity by 
combining the features of third-party mixers and tumblers into a convenient browser-based 
extension.121 According to Goldman et al., one such electronic wallet service, known as 
Dark Wallet, has a stated goal of making de-anonymizing DVC transactions impossible 
“by combining random contemporaneous transactions and then encrypting recipients’ 
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information so it does not appear on the blockchain.”122 Irwin and Milad state that Dark 
Wallet and other services like it “enhance anonymity of transactions by allowing illicit 
transactions to digitally ‘piggyback’ on non-illicit transactions,”123 resulting in a type of 
layering, or comingling of funds, that would be typical of contemporary money laundering 
techniques, such as when ill-gotten funds are carefully mixed with legitimate business 
funds and then deposited into an unsuspecting FI. Dark Wallet has a similar effect as 
mixing and tumbling combined in that the true amount of a transaction is obfuscated, as is 
the actual address of both the sender and the receiver, since the wallet produces new, 
unique, and unrelated addresses for each new transaction.124 Indeed, Dark Wallet founder 
Cody Wilson, of 3-D gun printing fame, has stated quite bluntly: “It’s just money 
laundering software.”125 
Summarizing the evolving technology being developed to support the private and 
anonymous use of the DVC Bitcoin, Irwin and Milad state, “It is feared that Dark Wallet 
services combined with a Tor Browser may allow Bitcoins to be transferred with complete 
anonymity.”126 However, this statement alludes to the fact that the majority of these 
services were designed to support and mask the known privacy deficiencies of public 
blockchains like those specifically underpinning Bitcoin. Unfortunately, though Bitcoin is 
still by far the most used DVC on the market, other DVCs are being developed with 
untraceability properties embedded into the currency. As de Balthasar and Hernandez-
Castro state, there are “alternative cryptocurrencies that offer improved anonymity and 
untraceability properties such as Monero or Zcash,”127 that LEAs should be more 
concerned with. 
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4. Newer Privacy Enhanced DVCs 
During his testimony to a U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee on S.1241: 
Modernizing AML Laws to Combat Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, Matthew 
Allen of DHS Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Homeland Security Investigations, 
acknowledges that newer more anonymous DVCs have been designed around a focus of 
more complete anonymity “to better obfuscate transaction information.”128 A prime 
example of an anonymity enhancing DVC includes Monero, which, as Zachary Goldman 
et al. explains, “attempts to ensure users’ privacy by combining multiple transactions,” 
making it impossible to isolate and pinpoint any one specific transaction.129 Additionally, 
unlike Bitcoin’s blockchain—which accurately records the involved addresses, times, and 
amounts of all transactions for public scrutiny—Monero, according to Olga Kharif, 
“encrypts the recipient’s address on its blockchain and generates fake addresses to obscure 
the real sender” as well as “the amount of the transaction.”130 Similarly, ZCash makes use 
of a next generation of DVC technology called Zero-proof to remove any identifying 
information from transactions, and according to Pouyan Bohloul et al., “renders the 
transaction untraceable.”131 Indeed, the need for additional, complex, third-party 
anonymizing techniques, tools, or software is no longer required of these newer DVCs, 
making them far simpler to use and thus far less prone to user errors that could lead to 
investigational vulnerabilities. It could be argued then, that any reasonably well-informed 
TO would not likely opt to continue to try to use Bitcoin for illicit activity over newer 
DVCs with greater or complete anonymity built right in. 
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C. GROWTH OF TO TECHNOLOGICAL SOPHISTICATION AND DVCS 
EASE OF USE 
Though growth and development in the scope of TOs’ technological capabilities 
have likely been far less explosive than in the fintech sector, evidence exists that TOs are 
making strides in their abilities to access and understand how to leverage diverse new 
technological means to achieve their objectives. Though previous assessments’ dismissive 
treatment of the anecdotal cases of DVC use by TOs may paint a less than compelling 
picture of terrorists undertaking large-scale adoption of DVCs, what these cases do infer is 
that TOs are gaining confidence in the use of emerging technologies and are actively 
acquiring technological sophistication. 
This section will revisit many of the same anecdotal use cases cited in previous 
assessments, as well as examine more recent developments, to aggregate a body of 
evidence that suggests that TO technological sophistication is growing steadily. 
Additionally, this body of evidence also suggests that the ease of use of DVCs has 
improved sufficiently to lower the bar of technological sophistication required to use them 
effectively and routinely. These developments serve to counter arguments that TOs lack 
the technological sophistication required to undertake large-scale DVC adoption. 
1. TO Technological Sophistication Grows 
Goldman et al. insist, “Many terrorist groups…operate in areas with poor 
infrastructure and low penetration of modern technical and telecommunications tools.”132 
Certainly, as much of this body of research insists, technical infrastructure may be lacking 
in such remote TO haunts as the Horn of Africa, Yemen, or sub-Saharan Africa, presenting 
a barrier to reliably using a strictly Internet based financial mechanism. However, not all 
TOs operate in such technology-austere environments, and even fewer TO supporters and 
financiers, located outside of these specific locations, contend with any kind of 
technological limitations. Indeed, Goldman et al. concede that many—arguably most—
TOs and their supporters are rarely left wanting for “[i]nternet access, computing 
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capabilities, or knowledge of sophisticated tactics to evade regulatory detection of 
electronic money movements.”133 With the rising risks associated with traditional terror 
finance methods, many TOs are actively seeking to leverage emerging fintech.134 
Some of the earliest known cases of efforts by TO supporters and would-be-
financiers suggest that illicit actors have the technological prowess to utilize DVCs as a 
mechanism to fund terror operations. For instance, an article posted on-line in 2014 by an 
author who identified himself as Taqi’ul-Deen al-Munthir specifically instructs jihadist 
sympathizers how to buy and transfer DVCs using third party anonymizing software, 
through countries with weak regulatory oversight to directly fund jihadists, or to buy 
weapons and supplies on hidden dark web marketplaces.135 According to Andy Greenberg 
of Wired Magazine, Dark Wallet was commended by name in several papers and blogs 
known for supporting ISIS.136 David Carlisle mentions a 2015 example of a U.S. teenager 
who was given jail time for “using Twitter to describe how to use Bitcoin to support 
Daesh.”137 Irwin and Milad cite unverified claims by Ghost Security Group who in 2015 
claim to have tracked DVC transactions to numerous wallets they believed to be owned by 
ISIS, containing up to $15.7 million.138 Moreover, some additional research goes further 
than reporting on just transactions and instructional material found online and instead point 
to specific terror operations that were directly funded utilizing DVCs. 
Irwin and Milad state that “there is evidence to suggest that Bitcoins have been 
utilized in a number of successful terror attacks,”139 including the coordinated November 
2015 terror attacks in France. Carlisle’s assessment supports this claim when he reports 
that a Daesh operative in Indonesia, alleged to have plotted a 2016 attack in Jakarta, used 
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DVC to transact with other jihadis.140 Further, he acknowledges that “[t]errorists us[e] VCs 
to purchase illegal firearms or explosive material on the dark web, as well as travel 
documents or other items to facilitate operations.”141 Though Carlisle suggests there is no 
indication that TOs use DVCs “as a payment tool with regularity,”142 if he and other 
security experts agree that TOs are already technologically capable of making purchases 
on DWMs, then there is little to stop them from utilizing unlicensed DVC exchanges and 
other anonymizing tools located there to effectively mask the indications that Carlisle and 
other researchers are looking for. 
As Maruyama and Hallahan stated in their CNAS primer on terrorist financing, 
“terrorist groups have displayed a remarkable ability to adapt and innovate to meet their 
financing needs.”143 Indeed, Joshua Baron et al. state in their report published by the 
RAND Corporation that “some non-state actors, in particular terrorist organizations, seem 
to have at least a limited ability to create secure cyber services, such as encryption 
platforms.”144 These reports suggest that it could be a mistake to dismiss TOs as 
technologically inept or as less capable than the TCOs that researchers suggests are using 
DVCs regularly.145 The U.S. Department of the Treasury agrees and has observed that TOs 
and TCOs have increasingly similar and at times interconnected complex business 
models.146 Indeed, few sustainable businesses can survive in the global economy without 
some level of knowledge about technology and web-based services, and as Healy and 
Christiansen suggest, “large-scale terrorist organizations are sophisticated modern 
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businesses with accounting and finance staff, spreadsheets and financial reports, social 
media fundraising platforms, and complex financial networks.”147 
ISIS specifically draws attention in all of the research referenced for this thesis 
because they have repeatedly proven to be an organization which remains incredibly 
flexible in their methods of finance, using effective modern accounting methods to support 
what is widely regarded as a financial operation of significant sophistication.148 According 
to the U.S. House Homeland Security Committee (HSC), “ISIS is unique in comparison to 
other terror groups in that it runs a state-like infrastructure designed to raise revenue and 
support government functions, such as providing social welfare services and waging 
war.”149 Their ability to support such complex infrastructure and utilize modern financial 
tools and methods suggests that they are not a group that should be considered constrained 
by a lack of technological sophistication or capability. 
Indeed, ISIS and its supporters have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to use 
Internet-based platforms like PayPal, GoFundMe, and CASHU, and have set up websites 
soliciting donations using Facebook, Twitter, and Skype.150 According to HSC, ISIS has 
displayed proficiency in utilizing these Internet-based technologies “to circumvent formal 
financial system controls and preserve anonymity,” and has also “used WhatsApp or Kik 
and messenger applications to coordinate drop-off points for cash or in-kind payments.”151 
Though these examples all involve publicly available, indexed-Internet hosted platforms, 
they demonstrate that as an organization, ISIS possesses the necessary technical acumen 
and infrastructure to use fintech and secure communication platforms. While there are few 
known cases that directly link ISIS to using DVCs on any meaningful scale with any 
regularity, it becomes difficult to say that they are not organized or technologically 
sophisticated enough to use a Tor browser and newer DVCs in DWMs carefully enough to 
have just not been caught. 
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2. DVCs’ Ease of Use Improves 
Broadly speaking, based on many of the developments in DVC market support, 
anonymizing tools and software, and newer, easier to use, fully anonymous DVCs 
discussed in this and earlier chapters, perhaps it is prudent to reassess just how much 
technological sophistication is actually required to use DVCs today. Smartphones and other 
wireless or cellular devices are operating more like full-fledged computers with every new 
iteration and anonymizing software like the Tor browser is already compatible with most 
smartphones.152 The number of DVC smartphone apps and smartphone-based wallets 
continues to multiply, and wireless coverage is steadily expanding to cover an ever-greater 
footprint across the globe. Because of these factors, Baron et al. suggest, “the usage of 
mobile phones to conduct everyday VC transactions should be viewed as feasible,”153 and 
add that a growing number of people are utilizing mobile money services requiring similar 
infrastructure in a number of developing countries such as Kenya, Somalia, Pakistan, Iran, 
and the Philippines. Dong He et al. with the IMF go further than discussing similar mobile 
money services and assert that “in the Philippines and Kenya, blockchain-based 
intermediaries offer money transfer services via Bitcoin and subsequent conversion of 
Bitcoins back into fiat currency for withdrawal by recipients through…their mobile 
phones.”154 It seems even in relatively remote locations around the globe, if a person has 
the technological sophistication to use a web browser or a smart phone, he or she can 
anonymously transact in DVCs. 
Smartphones, wallets, and apps are not the only means by which DVCs can easily 
be anonymously converted in remote locations by those who may lack considerable 
technical acumen. According to Irwin and Milad a rapidly growing number of DVC 
“ATMs and…exchanges are located in countries that have seen significant numbers of 
foreign fighters join ISIS in the Middle East and are also positioned in countries that have 
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seen increased risk of terror attack.”155 DVC ATMs in the United States are considered 
money transmitters under the BSA and as such are subject to AML/CFT regulations. 
However, because it is up to the individual owner/operator to enforce compliance, it is 
possible for anyone, including TOs to purchase and operate these ATMs in any country or 
jurisdiction, some lacking proper AML/CFT enforcement, where they may choose to 
simply overlook compliance measures.156 Again, referring to ATMs, Irwin and Milad 
further clarify the TO and DVC link when they state that “[t]hese present a significant risk 
because they allow for the seamless, anonymous transfer of funds to and from terrorist 
groups and their supporters.”157 As an example of the growing ease of use of DVCs, the 
use of an ATM kiosk is not today typically considered technologically arduous. 
For all the expansion of technology and the growth of cellular and wireless 
networks, an argument can still be made, that there will remain those few unconnected, 
remote areas where electricity and network connectivity for ATMs may not be available, 
and mobile phones may be unreliable. In these areas, TOs will be more likely to use more 
proven, traditional methods of illicit funds transfer such as informal MVTS like hawala 
networks.158 However, even low-tech money laundering methods could be augmented by 
DVCs. For example, some hawaladars who frequently travel to more urban and 
sophisticated areas to transfer and exchange their funds may elect to utilize DVCs 
somewhere within that system. Hawaladars could choose to utilize DVCs, as Goldman et 
al. suggests, to “effectively build a digital platform on top of established systems that 
currently allow terrorists, and others, to transfer cash on an international scale,”159 
Traditionally operated hawalas are already an AML/CFT threat, and the U.S. 
Homeland Security Committee has stated that, “Gaping weaknesses in reporting and 
oversight standards for hawala transactions hamper efforts to identify ISIS financiers and 
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hold financial institutions accountable.”160 Potentially compounding the issue, even in 
areas where terrorist A may not be able to directly transact DVC with terrorist B, their 
hawaladars who may have occasional access to the Internet or wireless networks could 
elect to utilize DVCs at any point within the network. If instead of carrying large quantities 
of bulk cash, hawaladars choose to try to reduce their risk by utilizing the security, speed, 
and cross-border capabilities of DVCs to augment or replace their use of cash, this could 
provide additional layering and anonymity to an already difficult to track method of terror 
finance.161 
The latest assessments regarding TOs’ use of DVCs, such as David Carlisle’s report 
to RUSI, warn that as organizations become more technologically adept, DVCs “could 
become an increasingly viable financing tool for terrorists.”162 Additionally, referring to 
ISIS, Zach Goldman et al. state that “a number of forum discussions on websites affiliated 
with the group show efforts by more technical members to educate their peers on the use 
of virtual currencies.”163 And indeed, evidence suggests that TOs are proving willing and 
increasingly able to effectively utilize many new payment products and services (NPPS) 
including DVCs. However, suggesting that vast improvements in technological abilities 
are required before TOs can effectively use and transfer DVCs to meet their needs, may go 
too far in making it seem as though an incredible level of technological ability is needed. 
The relative ease of use of anonymizing DVC apps, browsing software allowing access to 
DWMs, and fully anonymous DVCs has recently come down to the level of less tech savvy 
users as evidenced by the expanding, increasingly uncomplicated, network of connected 
devices like ATMs and mobile phones. As the convenience of technology expands to serve 
the greater licit masses, so too grows the opportunity for illicit actors to take advantage. 
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D. CONCLUSION 
Contrary to the findings of recent prior threat assessments, this chapter conclusively 
illustrates that the final two pillars on which low threat evaluations of DVC use by TOs 
were based—insufficient anonymity and a perception of technological sophistication 
among TOs being too low—may no longer support such dismissive arguments. After 
rebuttal of all four primary reasons cited by previous researchers, even with only anecdotal 
cases of DVC use by TOs, assumptions made by this most recent research may already be 
outdated. While difficult to prove, it is at least possible that the level of anonymity offered 
by newer DVC technology—including third-party tools designed to anonymize IP 
addresses, browsers, and existing DVCs—combined with the improving ease of use of 
DVCs and increasing TO technological acumen, regulators and LEAs may already be 
unable to monitor DVCs for illicit use. The following concluding chapter will explore the 
limited information available on reported LEA capabilities at detecting and tracking illicit 
flows of DVCs and offer a final determination on whether or not TOs may now find DVCs 
more attractive for current or future use.  
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V. CONCLUSION: LAW ENFORCEMENT CAPABILITIES AND 
THE NEED TO REEVALUATE THE THREAT 
This chapter, in conclusion, asserts that: LEAs must continue their efforts to 
develop new investigational techniques to monitor DVCs for illicit use, policy makers need 
to reconsider whether current AML/CFT regulations are sufficient to deter illicit use of 
DVCs, and that further and continuing research is needed to ensure that TOs are not able 
to take advantage of blind spots created by policy makers’ current belief of a low-threat 
assessment. In the most recent assessment considered for this thesis, Goldman et al. state: 
“as new cryptocurrencies become more anonymous, and if terrorist groups develop more 
of the characteristics of criminal enterprises, such as broader person-to-person networks of 
trust, technical sophistication, and the need for a wider funding base, virtual currencies 
might become more attractive,”164—very nearly predicting the precise developments that 
unfolded within twelve months of that report. Indeed, much of the research completed as 
recently as mid-2017 that purports TOs are not capable of—or interested in—utilizing 
DVCs is already dated and based on assumptions inconsistent with the current state of TO 
capabilities and the DVC market, and could potentially lead to dangerous oversights by the 
U.S. homeland security enterprise and unacceptable vulnerabilities to U.S. national 
security. 
Though the growth of DVC markets, broader commercial acceptance, 
improvements in anonymity, greater ease of use, and the increasing technological 
capabilities of TOs may have come to fruition just after much of the existing research relied 
on in this thesis went to print, LEAs and security experts have been making some efforts 
to contain the potential threat. Indeed, a sort of arms race between developers of 
anonymizing fintech, security researchers, and law enforcement has inevitably developed, 
but because law enforcement is typically on the reactionary side of the race, fintech 
developers tend to stay one step ahead, innovating new privacy centric tools and methods 
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faster than law enforcement can cope.165 While LEAs and fintech developers seem to be 
taking their opposing roles in AML/CFT compliance and financial transaction transparency 
seriously, and in a timely manner, researchers and policy makers that rely on that research 
have been somewhat slower to respond. 
A. LAW ENFORCEMENT CAPABILITIES OR LACK THEREOF 
In what should be good news for AML/CFT regulators, recent law enforcement 
actions suggest that DVCs, Tor, and other anonymizing tools are not necessarily 
impenetrable. Starting as early as October 2013, when U.S. authorities shut down and 
arrested the administrator of the DWM Silk Road,166 and as recently as July 2017, when 
DWMs AlphaBay and Hansa Market were taken down and their administrators arrested,167 
law enforcement appears to be making some progress in investigating DVC transactions as 
well as DWMs created with and operated using Tor. It remains unclear, however, whether 
LEAs have actually made progress in cracking open blockchains and DWMs using new, 
breakthrough, technologically developed methods or if perhaps these cases may have been 
a result of simple user error on the side of inexperienced or careless criminals. 
According to University of Michigan researchers cited in the HSSAI assessment, 
“offenders use Tor inconsistently” and “[o]ver 90 percent of regular Tor users send traffic 
from a non-Tor IP at least once after first using Tor.”168 HSSAI’s report implies that 
prosecutions of DWMs utilizing Tor are most likely due to carelessness on the part of the 
site’s administrator rather than because of any new tools or techniques leveraged by law 
enforcement. The New York Times story on the takedown of AlphaBay and Hansa Market 
confirm that carelessness and misuse of Tor was indeed the case with at least one of the 
apprehended administrators.169 While such working groups as the DHS Science and 
Technology Directorate, which enlists the help of one of the original developers of Tor--
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the Naval Research Laboratory--have been created to develop tools and techniques needed 
to covertly access and investigate DWMs, the continued operation of such markets as the 
now popular Dream Market, serve as evidence that authorities do not yet have unfettered 
access to the dark web, lest Dream Market and many others like it would also be shut down. 
Indeed, following the demise of AlphaBay and Hansa Market, former FBI Deputy Director 
Andrew McCabe stated, “Critics will say that as we shutter one site, another will emerge, 
and they may be right…there is always a new player waiting in the wings ready to fill those 
shoes.”170 While it remains unclear whether or not LEAs possess the tools needed to 
infiltrate DWMs, either way, authorities likely lack the manpower, budget, or technology 
to quickly and easily pursue them all considering the rate at which countless new DWMs 
are springing up.171 
If Tor and DWMs remain a DVC market variable that cannot yet be fully rendered 
non-threatening, perhaps investigational access will be gained through monitoring DVC 
blockchains for suspicious activity? Unfortunately, this also does not seem likely since as 
David Carlisle notes in a 2017 assessment by Europol: “the majority of law enforcement 
currently has its attention focused on Bitcoin, a fact which is not lost on the criminal 
community.”172 Certainly following the takedown of several high profile individuals and 
DWMs, TOs and the criminal community have come to realize that law enforcement, 
working with numerous analytic firms, have gained proficiency at flagging suspicious 
Bitcoin transactions and are now better able to track and monitor its users, as is evidenced 
by the trove of data compiled by Fanusie and Robinson in their study for the Foundation 
for Defense of Democracies.173 These same analysis and monitoring techniques are 
apparently not yet as effective with such privacy enhanced DVCs like Monero or Zcash, 
however, and could potentially be a contributing factor in why data from this same study 
of Bitcoin indicated a “sharp drop in 2016 that mirrored an across-the-board decline in the 
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proportion of illicit transactions.”174 Interestingly, Zcash first began trading in late October 
of 2016 when it was met by an immediate buying frenzy according to the New York 
Times,175 and though Monero had been on the market since 2014, its market cap grew by 
nearly 2,800 percent in 2016 alone, and was up over 115,000 percent from its 2015 price 
by the end of 2017.176 These developments suggest that while LEAs and security 
researchers were still primarily focused on Bitcoin, TOs and other criminal networks may 
have quietly adopted other, harder to investigate DVCs. 
Though some regulatory technology has been developed in an effort to at least flag 
suspicious transactions utilizing privacy enhanced DVCs, specifically discussing the 
opaque blockchain of Monero, Olga Kharif asserts that its underlying protocols are 
effective enough to confuse regulatory technology software created by companies such as 
Coinfirm, a company which “helps exchanges and other companies avoid tainted 
money,”177 into flagging every transaction as a risk, effectively negating the software’s 
ability to prove or disprove that funds originated from known illegal sources. As David 
Carlisle concludes, “The use of highly anonymized VCs on encrypted dark web platforms 
raises the prospect that law enforcement may be operating with blind spots.”178 
However, even with the relative ease of use offered by these newer, more 
anonymous DVCs, coupled with the encryption and privacy available to users of network 
masking tools such as Tor, previous assessments cling to the fragile hope that TOs do not 
possess, and will not develop, the infrastructure or technological sophistication required to 
utilize DVCs on a meaningful scale. Unfortunately, as previously noted, TOs are 
measurably gaining technological sophistication while the level of sophistication required 
to utilize DVCs is simultaneously being lowered. 
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Ultimately, while law enforcement and security researchers have had some limited 
success in penetrating certain individual, stand-alone anonymizing services, as evidenced 
by de Balthasar and Hernandez-Castro’s detailed efforts at defeating numerous tumblers, 
mixers, and privacy enhanced DVCs, these narrow-field, isolated successes do not mean 
that these kinds of anonymizing tools have been rendered impotent.179 In fact, as recently 
as January 2018, at a workshop for financial investigators organized jointly by Europol, 
Interpol, and the Basel Institute on Governance, due to their broad effectiveness in 
anonymizing transactions, “which burdens the work of law enforcement agencies to detect 
and trace suspicious transactions,”180 the need to take action specifically against mixers 
and tumblers was among the top four concerns. Additionally, this group showed great 
concern for the need to develop and apply regulations not only to DVC exchanges, as is 
currently the case in most jurisdictions, but for wallet providers as well.181 
B. FURTHER RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION ARE NEEDED 
Recent developments in DVCs and the ecosystems that support them suggests that 
the primary pillars on which prior research has been built may have eroded sufficiently to 
warrant further and continued investigation of the potential threat posed by terrorist use of 
DVCs. The body of existing research regarding the threat of terrorists use of DVCs has 
determined that though it has become the payment method of choice for cybercriminals 
and many TCOs, researchers do not believe that TOs will leverage DVCs on an appreciable 
scale in the near future. To justify their determinations, the authors of this prior research 
focused on four primary reasons why TOs are more likely to exploit other less complicated, 
time tested methods of moving money. First, the authors assert that the overall size of the 
DVC market is too small to support the typical scale and liquidity required to reliably 
finance large scale terror operations. Second, the commercial contexts in which DVCs are 
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accepted are so limited that terrorists will be forced to make use of exchanges to acquire 
fiat currency for use in local transactions, exposing them to the scrutiny of AML/CFT 
regulations that registered DVC exchanges must currently operate under. Third, the most 
well-known and broadly accepted DVC, Bitcoin, has proven not to be as anonymous as 
terrorists require for successful evasion of detection and identification. Fourth and finally, 
TOs tend to lack the technological infrastructure and sophistication required to effectively 
utilize a strictly Internet-based currency. 
As discussed in this and previous chapters, however, following recent 
developments on all four fronts, the rapidly growing utility of DVCs is not likely to go 
unnoticed by either legitimate or illicit communities hoping to capitalize on a faster, 
cheaper, more anonymous method to move funds globally. The homeland security 
enterprise, therefore, should not allow itself to be lulled into complacency or otherwise 
pacified by existing and already outdated research. Indeed, if LEAs let their guard down 
and inadvertently enable the use of DVC by TO on a scale that competes with cash or other 
readily available means of financing, such a development could present unique challenges 
for regulators, policy makers, and law enforcement because it offers the potential for an 
illicit funding network that can be very difficult to disrupt or even detect.  
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